Introduction
The French Republican Model appears as a polar case among the di¤erent cultural integration models. Dating back to the French Revolution and the Third Republic, France has a long secular tradition imposing restrictive attitudes on the expression of religious and cultural identity in the public sphere.There is however growing concerns that this model, despite its claimed egalitarian and universalism, fails to integrate the new immigrant minorities. The most illustrative example is the 2004 ruling against the display of conspicuous religious symbols in school, mainly targeted to Muslim schoolgirls who wished to wear the hijab. The main consequence of this refusal to acknowledge any minorities has been an inability to know whether the reality of equality matched the rhetoric of perfect cultural integration. While views on national identity and the integration model are very strong-held in France, the evidence base are rather weak. The goal of this chapter is to …ll this gap.
Immigration has a very long history in France since the late nineteenth century (Noiriel, 1988) . In the 1920s, France was ranked second (after USA) as the country with the highest share of immigrants, reaching 7% of total population. In the early 2000s, as most as 25% of the population has some immigrant background, from the …rst, the second or the third generation. Table 1 reports the composition of the immigration population according to the most recent dataset, the French Labor Force Survey, for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] . It distinguishes the sample proportions of native French, …rst-generation immigrants, and second-generation immigrants. Around 90.2 percent of the sample consists of natives, 6.5 percent are …rst-generation immigrants and around 3.3 percent are second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants mostly come from the Yann Algan : Sciences Po, Cepremap, yann.algan@sciences-po.fr. Camille Landais : UC Berkeley, Cepremap, camille_landais@berkeley.edu. Claudia Senik : Paris School of Economics, Cepremap, senik@pse.ens.fr.
Maghreb (44.1 percent), Southern Europe (24.8 percent), and Africa (11.3 percent). These proportions are slightly modi…ed for second-generation immigrants, the share of people with origins from Southern Europe is higher (37.4) while those with origins from Africa (5.0) and the Maghreb (40.7) is lower. Table 1 also shows an evolution in the composition of the immigrant population. Immigration from Southern Europe, in particular from Italy and Spain, has been one of the main in ‡ows since the late nineteenth, with some peaks such as the in ‡ows of Spanish immigrants during the Spanish Civil War. A second wave of immigration from Southern Europe took place in the 1960s and the 1970s, with still an ongoing in ‡ows from Portugal now.
Immigration from Maghreb dates back to as early as the World War I, due to the replacement of the labor force in farms and arm industry. But the main wave of immigration from this region took place after World War II. Immigration in ‡ows come from three main countries: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Immigration from Algeria boomed after World War II until 1958 and the Algerian civil war. Immigration from Morocco and Tunisia took place later in the 1970s.
The group of immigrants from Sub-Saharian Africa is more recent and concentrated on French ex-colonies: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal. Another set of recent immigrants is from Eastern Europe and Turkey, with an ongoing in ‡ows from this latter country since the 1970s. Finally, the lowest group of immigrants come from Asia. Most of these immigrants come from ex-French colonies in South East Asian: Combodia, Laotiaand Vietnam. This immigration is rather recent and linked to the retreat by westerners from Asia after the Vietnam war.
France immigration policy is rather pragmatic and dictated by the labor market conditions. First generation immigrants are now accorded permits of various tenure from 1 year to 10 years. Only direct dependants are allowed to follow the head of the household immigrant. Regarding citizenship, Weil (2002 Weil ( , 2005 documents that France is one of the most open countries in Europe. For second-generation, naturalization comes from the right of soil. Any-one born in France is granted with French citizenship, but this right becomes e¤ective most of the time when children are older than 18 years only. Despite France's long immigration tradition, and the growing concerns about persistent cultural di¤erences with immigrants from Maghreb and Africa, very few studies have provided a quantitative assessment on the cultural integration path. Most studies have rather looked at economic outcomes. Silberman and Fournier (1999, 2007) look at job outcomes and show the persistent employment penalty for second-generation Maghrebins compared to French natives and other immigrant groups (see also Meurs et al., 2006) . Fougère and Sa… (2007) look at the role of naturalization on employment prospects in France, and …nd a signi…cant e¤ect. Aeberhardt and Pouget (2007) estimate national wage origin di¤erential by matching employer-employee data. They typically …nd that earnings di¤erentials mostly re‡ect di¤erences in the type of jobs, suggesting the existence of France of occupational segregation rather than mere wage discrimination.
In other social sciences a strong debate opposes the supporters of the Republican model stressing that ethnic origin does not have to interfere with the public sphere (Schnapper, 1991) and those who call for a civil society more open to multiculturalism (Wieviorka, 1996 (Wieviorka, , 2006 . But few economic studies have tried to quantify the evolution process of cultural attitudes by waves of immigration and birth cohorts (see Courbage and Todd, 2007 for a seminal study).
This article tries to …ll this gap by providing a quantitative assessment of the path of cultural integration in France, and how it correlates with economic integration of immigrants.
Data and methods

Data
We investigate the patterns of integration in France by using three main surveys.
We measure labor market and educational outcomes with the French Labor Force Survey (FLFS), which cover the years [2005] [2006] [2007] . In addition to the traditional information on country of birth of the respondent, the FLFS has, since 2005, provided information on the country of birth of the parents. The FLFS contains information on country of birth for …rst-generation immigrants at a very detailed level. The FLFS distinguishes between 29 countries or country groups.
1 The FLFS also reports the country of parental birth for the second generation but at a more aggregate level. There are 9 categories: France, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Maghreb (Arab North Africa), Turkey (Middle East), (sub-saharan) Africa, Asia, and other countries. We exclude the last category as it comprises very heterogeneous populations. This leaves us with seven immigrant groups for our analysis. To facilitate the comparison of the results between …rst-generation and second-generation immigrants, we aggregate the more detailed countries of birth of …rst-generation immigrants into the seven broader immigrant categories. The native reference group consists of individuals who are in France for at least two generations, i.e. those who are born in the country and whose two parents were also born in France. First-generation immigrants are individuals born abroad and whose both parents were also born abroad and from the same country of origin. Second-generation immigrants are individuals who are born in France but whose parents are both born abroad. We exclude individuals born abroad with at least one parent born in France and individuals born in France with either one parent born in France and the other born abroad or both parents born abroad but in di¤erent countries.
We measure fertility rates based on the 1999 French Family Survey ("Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999"). This survey is conducted in parallel with the Population Census and aims at analyzing the evolution of family structures. It consists of a sub-sample of 380,000 adults, and the survey includes several questions about family status and family relationship, country of birth of the respondent, of her relatives (parents, husband/wife), language spoken at home, with children, with parents, etc. In particular this survey is extensively used for fertility studies because it is the only survey to provide with the possibility to compute reliable completed fertility rates.
The French family survey displays three types of information concerning the origins of the respondent. First it contains information on country of birth at a somehow detailed level. The recorded countries are broken down in 16 categories. Second, the survey contains information on the country of birth of the father, of the mother, and of the spouse. The countries that are recorded are exactly the same as for the survey respondent. Eventually, the survey displays information on the nationality (citizenship) of the respondent (at the time the survey was conducted, and at birth). The list of citizenship is exactly the same as the list of country of birth. To compute broad homogenous regions of origins, we aggregated countries as follows: i) France: France, ii) Northern and eastern Europe: "other northern and eastern european countries", Turkey; iii) Southern Europe: Italy, Spain, Portugal; iv) Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia; v) Africa: "other African countries"; Asia: Vietnam, Laos, Cambogia, "other Asian countries"; vi) Others: America, "all other countries". Note that contrary to the Labor Force Survey used for the analysis of economic integration, we cannot make a distinction here between individuals from Northern European countries and those from Eastern European countries.
In order to explore subjective attitudes of immigrants, we also a survey "Histoires de Vies", conducted in 2003 by the French national statistical o¢ ce (INSEE) with other institutional partners. The sample of the survey includes 8403 adults living in France (metropolitan), with a deliberate over-representation of immigrants of the …rst and second generation. The survey includes many questions pertaining to subjective identity, gender issues and work values. It contains information about the country of birth of surveyed persons, their parents and their living partner (if any). Due to the small size of the sample, we only distinguish four main categories of ethnic origin, aggregating countries into large regions as follows: i) France; ii) Southern Europe: Italy, Spain, Portugal; iii) North Africa or Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia; and iv) Rest of the World (foreign country, but not Southern Europe or Maghreb). We chose to distinguish Maghreb and South Europe as these are the most important sources of immigration in France. For instance, in the 1999 French census, these two groups accounted for 62% of foreign immigrants.
Speci…cations
We measure the evolution of cultural attitudes with two main speci…cations. The …rst speci…cation compares the outcomes between …rst and second generation of immigrants:
where j ( j ) measures the impact of being a …rst-generation immigrant ( secondgeneration immigrant) from country j relative to natives. The comparison between
Another set of estimates aims at making comparison of outcome between di¤erent birth cohorts within each wave of immigrations. With cross-sectional dataset, the speci…cation becomes:
where j;k is the impact of being …rst-generation immigrant from country j and belonging to the birth cohort k, relative to the natives. In this speci…cation, we distinguish between two di¤erent groups of cohorts born before 1970 and born after 1970. For all estimates, we systematically restrict the sample to uncensored observations. For instance, to estimate the diversity of ages at …rst child, we restrict the sample to women older than 35. For age gap between spouses, we also restrict the sample to women older than 40. This method is convenient but does not enable us to investigate speci…cations of the form (2).
Fertility and Marriage
Fertility and Age at First Child
We look at two di¤erent outcomes in terms of fertility: completed fertility rates and age at …rst child.
To investigate the impact of ethnicity on completed fertility rates, we restrict the sample to women older than 40 to avoid censoring issues due to younger women not having completed their fertility yet. An alternative solution would have been to include all women regardless of their age and to include a polynomial in the age of the woman as explanatory variables.
3 Table 2 reports the coe¢ cient estimates associated with completed fertility rates of immigrants relative to natives. Positive coe¢ cients on …rst generation migrants in the …rst column of table 2 means that, regardless of their region of origin, immigrants have a greater completed fertility rate on average than native women. Among all immigrants, immigrants from Maghreb, Asia and Africa exhibit the highest fertility rates. First generation immigrant women from Maghreb have on average .56 more children than natives, and immigrants from Asia and Africa have .32 more children than natives. However, this discrepancy seems to be greatly reduced for the 2nd generation of immigrants. Second generation women from Maghreb have only .16 more children during their lives than natives. For second generation women from Asian origins, the di¤erence with natives vanishes completely and is not signi…cantly di¤erent from 0. Women born from parents from Southern Europe have even .24 less children on average than French Natives.
To estimate age at …rst child, we use all women aged 40 or younger and use a censored model to control for women without children at their current age.
Results are displayed in table 3 and show that …rst generation immigrants from Africa, Southern Europe and Maghreb tend to have children earlier than natives. Median age at …rst birth is 1 year earlier for …rst generation immigrants from Africa, and .23 year and .35 year earlier for women from Southern Europe and Maghreb respectively. Note that these di¤erences tend to persist among second generation women from Africa and Maghreb who still have their …rst child .35 and .33 year earlier respectively than native women.
Marriage and divorce rates
We next consider marriage patterns. We compare marriage rates at age 25 5 for natives and …rst and second generation of immigrants. We restrict the sample to all men and women aged between 25 and 40. Table 4 displays the results for men and women, and then breaks down the results by gender. Marginal e¤ects at the mean of a probability model of being or having been married at age 25 are reported.
Results show that …rst generation immigrants tend to marry more and earlier than native individuals. This di¤erence is especially large for individuals coming from Europe and Southern Europe, and for individuals coming from Maghreb. The probability of being married at age 25 is 7.9 percentage points higher for European immigrants, 7.2 percentage points higher for immigrants from Southern Europe and 1 percentage point higher for immigrants from Maghreb.
6 But this di¤erence is greatly reduced for the second-generation of immigrants and even reversed for second generation immigrants from Maghreb who have a slightly smaller probability of being married at age 25 than native individuals (minus 2 percentage point). The next columns of table 4 investigate the same probability model for men and women separately. The main result is that men and women from the same region of origin do not seem to di¤er signi…cantly in their marriage behaviors. Both men and women migrating from Europe and Southern Europe have a higher probability of being married at age 25 than native French but second generation men and women from these same regions do not have signi…cantly di¤erent marriage behaviors from that of native French. Note however that among immigrants from Maghreb, only women seem to be more likely to be married when they are young (with a higher probability of 2.6 percentage point) whereas men seem to marry later. This may re ‡ect the di¤erent nature of immigration between men and women from Maghreb, men coming younger and for working purposes and women coming for family reasons (regroupement familial).
5 Marriage rate at age 25 is de…ned as the fraction of individuals being or having been married at age 25 6 Note the average probability of being married at age 25 is 27 percent in our estimation sample.
We then look at divorce patterns. We consider the fraction of individuals who ever got divorced.
7 Table 5 shows that divorce rates among …rst generation of immigrants are very close to that of Natives. But interestingly, it seems that among second generation individuals, divorce rates are greater than that of French Natives. For second generation immigrants from Magrheb for instance, men have a 4.9 percentage point probability of being divorced once married than native French, and this probability is 4.2 higher for women. Along with the evidence of high endogamy rates among second generation immigrants from Maghreb, this may suggest the existence of some cultural tension in the marriage model of Maghrebin communities, with some conservative elements (high marriage and endogamy rates) being challenged by elements of high cultural integration (educational gap, etc) which may explain higher divorce rates.
Inter-ethnic marriage
This section explores the frequency of inter-ethnic marriage. Table 6 reports the fraction of each community that is married to someone of a di¤erent immigration backgrounds. We distinguish three categories: a marriage with a native spouse, a marriage with a spouse who comes from the same country of origin, grouping together spouse from …rst and second generation, and marriages with non-native spouses coming from a di¤erent country of origin. We distinguish the exogamy rates among …rst and second generation respondents.
The proportion of immigrants whose spouse or partner comes from the same country of origin (either …rst or second generation) is naturally higher for …rst generation immigrants. The endogamy rates are equal to 74 percent for 1st generation Maghrebin, 69 percent for 1st generation African, 85 percent for 1st generation immigrants from Turkey or Middle East, and 79 percent for 1st generation immigrants from Asia. When we turn to immigrants from other European countries, the endogamous marriage rate is also higher than marriage rates with natives.
But as Table 6 shows, this endogamy is strongly reduced in the second generation: 23.4 % for South Europeans, 39.3 percent for Africans, 51 percent for Turkish, and 53% for Maghrebins. Maghrebin immigrants of the …rst and second generation remain particularly endogamous, as compared to other groups. This is con…rmed by regression analysis controlling for the individual characteristics aforementioned. 7 Note that we therefore restrict the sample to individuals married or having been married. To control for possible censoring of younger individuals who may …nally get divorced, we include a polynomial in age. Table 7 reports estimates for the age gap between the spouse, which could capture a gender inequality. Immigrant women of the …rst and second generations do not seem to get married younger than French natives. Identically, their age at the …rst child is not signi…cantly lower than that of French natives, except for the …rst generation immigrants from Maghreb, where the age gap is in average 2 years higher than for native couples; and up to 3.6 years higher when both spouses share the same origin. The age di¤erence between spouses is statistically di¤erent for …rst-generation immigrants from Maghreb, but not for the second generation. However, when one distinguishes endogamous couples (where both spouses come from the same country) from exogamous ones, the di¤erence is persistent and statistically signi…cant, even for second-generation immigrants (the age di¤erence is about 2 years higher than for French native couples).
Spousal age gap
Educational attainment and Gender Gap in Education
Another way immigrants are thought to be di¤erent from the French native is the level of education and the attitudes towards gender equality in education. We document these education patterns, focusing on the sample of individuals older than 26 years old and who have left education. Table 8 reports education distribution and the gender gap in education for natives and immigrants.
Educational attainment
We …rst measure the gap in educational attainment of immigrants relative to French natives. We measure the evolution of this gap between di¤erent birth cohort of immigrants and waves of immigration. We start by regressing the age left-full time education on dummies for the country of origin of …rst and second generations. Native French are the reference group. The controls are a quadratic in year of birth, time dummies for the di¤erent waves of the survey, and region dummies. Figure 1 reports the educational gap for immigrant men relative to natives. The x-axis reports the coe¢ cients for second-generation immigrants and the y-axis reports the coe¢ cients for the …rst-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrant men from Africa, Northern Europe and Eastern Europe are 1 or 2 years older when leaving full-time education than their native counterparts, who themselves leave education when they are on average around 18.3 years old. First-generation immigrant men from Southern Europe and Turkey are on average 3 years and 1 year younger than native men, respectively, when they leave education while immigrants from the Maghreb and Asia are of about the same age. From the …rst to the second generation, the gap in educational attainment relative to natives becomes negative for most immigrant groups. For instance, second generation immigrants from Maghreb and Africa are 0.3 and 0.4 year younger when they leave the education system. Note however that the negative gap for Southern European men decreases from -2.9 years to -0.2 years from the …rst to the second generation. Figure 2 shows that only …rst-generation women from Northern and Eastern Europe are at least as old as native women when they complete their full-time education. All other groups are signi…cantly younger than both native women and their male immigrant counterparts. Immigrants from Maghreb are almost 1 year younger, and immigrants from Southern Europe are 3 years younger. But there is an important improvement from the …rst to the second generation in terms of educational attainment, in particular among the groups which were the most disadvantaged in the …rst-generation. Second-generation Asian women are performing outstandingly well, with an edge of 1.4 years of education relative to native French women. Second-generation women from Maghreb and Southern Europe also catch up almost their educational lag.
Next, we provide a complementary picture of the evolution of the educational gap by distinguishing immigrants by birth cohorts. We focus on second generation immigrants and compare the educational gap relative to natives among the young generation, born after 1970, and the old generation born before 1970. We run two separate regressions for the two di¤erent cohorts, taking the native as the reference group for each generation. Figure 3 reports the evolution pattern for men. Among natives, the average age left full-time education is 20.67 years old for the young generation against 17.83 years old for the old generation, which represents a signi…cant increase of almost 3 years. Relative to natives, the young second generation immigrants are sometimes performing worse than the older cohort. Take the case of immigrants from Maghreb, who have an edge of .11 years among the old generation, and trail back by -.45 years among the young generation. Naturally, this evolution does not mean that the younger cohort is less educated than the old one (in the particular case of immigrants from Maghreb, the younger cohort is one-year more educated than the old one), but the gap relative to the natives has increased. The same is true for immigrants from Turkey. Figure 4 shows the results for women. The evolution pattern by birth cohort is slightly di¤erent to the one of their male counterpart. In general, the gap narrows among the young cohort, or remains fairly identical.
Gender gap in education
We next turn to the gender gap in education. Table ? ? presents estimates of the gender gap in education for the main economic minorities for the two waves of immigrations and two di¤erent birth cohort: being born before or after 1970. We measure the gender gap by including a dummy women in the regression of the average age left full-time education. We measure the evolution in this gender gap by interacting the dummy women with dummies for …rst-and second-generation immigrants and the two birth cohorts. The only covariates we include in addition to the controls for immigrant status are a quadratic in the year of birth as well as region dummies and time period dummies. Table ? ? shows that in the benchmark case of natives, the gender gap is about 0.13 years. The gender gap is higher for all the other immigrants, in particular among immigrants from Africa (2.46 years) , Asia (2.61 years) and Turkey (1.61 years). Table ? ? also reports the gender gap by wave of immigration. The gender gap is more marked among the …rst-generation immigrants from Maghreb, Africa, Asia, Turkey and Eastern Europe. But quite remarkably, the pattern is reversed for second-generation immigrants from Maghreb and Asia where women have an education of 0.3 years and 1.39 years higher compared to their men counterparts. In contrast, the gap remains steady for immigrants from Africa and Turkey.
The …rst important result is that the gender gap decreases dramatically as we move from the …rst to the second generation, and from the old to the young cohorts. Take the example of immigrants from Maghreb. While there is a statistically signi…cant di¤erence of .72 years among the …rst generation, the gap becomes no longer statistically signi…cant for the second generation.
Female employment
We now turn to the analysis of female employment rate. Table 10 reports employment for women by country of birth and wave of immigration. The sample is made up of prime-age women between 25 years and 59 years old included. For almost all ethnic group, the employment rate is much lower relative to the native women, whose employment rate reaches 74.4 percent. The employment gap is the most signi…cant for foreign-born women from Maghreb, Africa and Turkey, whose employment rate is 43.0 percent, 53.9 percent and 20.0 percent respectively. The di¤erence is more marked among married women with children than within single women.
The female employment rate increases signi…cantly from the …rst to the second generation of immigrants. The employment rate of second generation women immigrant from Maghreb increases by 16.6 points relative to …rst generation immigrants. Within married women immigrant from Maghreb with dependent children, the em-ployment rate increases by 20 points from the …rst to the second generation. Figure 5 reports the evolution of the employment gap between …rst and second generation immigrants. The coe¢ cients are the marginal e¤ects from probit estimates on employment, controlling for age and education. The regressions are run on the whole prime-age population between 25 and 59 years old, where French-native women are taken as the reference group. Table 11 reports the probit estimates with the standard error. Column 1 does not include any controls. Column 2 controls for age and education and reports the coe¢ cients associated with Figure 5 . Figure 5 shows that the employment gap narrows signi…cantly for all country of origin.
Values and Beliefs
National identity
In the survey Histoire de Vies, a series of question were asked concerning the elements of the respondents'identity. Table 12 documents the result for national identity. Analyzing these questions reveals that if …rst generation immigrants tend to have di¤erent attitudes and values, as compared to French natives, this di¤erence is largely attenuated for second generation immigrants. For example, the respondents are asked about their attachment to a particular country or continent: "Overall, do you feel mostly: from a French region, French, European, from another country, from another continent". Second generation immigrants are more likely to declare that they feel French than the …rst generation. First generation immigrants from Southern Europe are 50% less likely to declare that they feel French than are French natives, controlling for age, gender, and education. This is particularly true of those who were born after 1970 (where the probability is reduced by 77%). In the second generation, immigrants from Southern Europe are still 16% less likely to declare that they feel French than native French. Those who were born after 1970 are 3 times less likely to declare that they feel French. By contrast, if …rst generation immigrants from Maghreb are (28%) less likely to "feel French", this e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant for second generation immigrants from this region. Table 13 documents the results for job identity. Among immigrants, the second generation more often chooses "occupation"in the list of the three most important elements of their identity. Hence, the second generation of Maghrebins is not statistically less likely to choose this item, whereas it is the case for the …rst generation (especially the older cohort). Table 14 documents the role-model of migrants'parents. It is striking that 13% of second-generation Maghrebin immigrants declare that when they were 15 years old, they did not (or never) see their father work or that their father was absent or unknown. Concerning the labour force participation of women, the proportion of respondents who declare that they saw their mother work when they were 15 years old is also signi…cantly lower amongst immigrants of the …rst and second generation.
Religion
Among the elements of identity, religion is a source of cultural di¤erences. Table  15 shows that immigrants attach a high importance to the transmission of religion to their children. There is essentially no decrease in this attitude from the …rst to the second generation of Maghrebins. Surprisingly, this attachment to religious transmission is more pronounced in the younger cohort of Maghrebins born after 1970. Table 15 shows that the proportion of immigrants of the …rst generation who declare that they have a religious practice is higher than that of French natives. This di¤erence almost disappears for the second generation, except for Maghrebins, for whom this attitude remains statistically more pronounced, even in the younger generation of those born after 1970.
Language
Another dimension of integration and identity is language. In the survey, the following question is asked: "What language(s) did your parents usually speak when you were a child (around 5 years old)?". Proposed answers are: only French, another language, French and another language, two other languages. If the respondent answers that his parents spoke another language (including French), he is asked about this language, and whether he speaks in this language with his spouse,his children (who live in France), other adults living in the household and other adults living in the neighborhood. This concerns 1 863 persons (18% of the sample).
Even at the second generation, about 30% of immigrants declare that they speak in their foreign mother tongue with their spouse, children, family or their neighbors. The di¤erences shown in Table 17 remain statistically signi…cant in a regression with the usual controls, for all migrants from South Europe and Maghreb, of the two considered cohorts. (The …rst row of Table 17 concerns French natives, i.e. including immigrants of the third generation of more. 10% of them still speak in a foreign language with their relatives or friends).
Conclusion
This chapter has compared a wide range of outcomes for the main groups of immigrants in France with the outcomes for French natives. The indicators we look at are fertility, marriage and divorce rates, inter-ethnic marriage, spousal age gaps, the gender gap in education, employment rates, national identity, religiosity and language use. We …nd substantial heterogeneity across communities but also evidence that in almost all dimensions and for all groups, there is a fast integration process between …rst and second generation immigrants. The rate of cultural and economic integration is faster for some variables than others. It is religion, family arrangements and endogamy that shows the slowest rate, in particular among immigrants from Maghreb. Second generation from Maghreb also display a persistent penalty in terms of employment. Yet this slower assimilation process in religious and family arrangements does not go against a strong feeling of French identity among the second generation immigrants from Maghreb. [15] Weil, P., 2002, Qu'est-ce qu'un immigré, Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution, Grasset, Paris.
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